New data obtained from the State Agency for National Security (SANS) and a preliminary analysis of nearly 1,000 prosecution files paint a fuller picture of the scale and mechanisms involved in the use of special surveillance means (SSM) and prosecutorial investigations against magistrates. The data, presented by Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC) Co-Chair and attorney Adela Katchaounova to the General Assembly of the Union of Judges in Bulgaria, build on the findings of her report Wiretapping Justice with information that was not available when it was drafted earlier this year.
Following a complaint filed by the BHC, a court order compelled SANS to provide data on the use of SSM for the period 2015–2024. It revealed that during this period the agency obtained authorisations to use SSM against 104 magistrates. Such authorisations were even issued by the Burgas Court of Appeal, despite that court lacking statutory jurisdiction to do so under the Special Surveillance Means Act. Material evidence (ME) was gathered against 50 of the 104 individuals under surveillance; SANS claims that any remaining evidence has been destroyed.
This revelatory data confirms and supplements the information we gathered from other institutions. Another new element it allows is the preliminary statistical analysis of prosecution files against magistrates. Our study has examined 1,178 prosecutorial acts and procedural developments relating to 982 unique prosecutorial files. A sharp increase can be seen after 2018: from isolated or relatively rare instances in previous years to 145 in 2018, up to 226 in 2020 and then a peak of 248 in 2021. Following the closure of the specialised justice system in 2022, the number fell to just six in 2023. The peak in case files coincided with the peak in SSM authorisations: in 2020, the Specialised Criminal Court of Appeal issued 62 such authorisations.
Our analysis additionally reveals a high degree of institutional concentration. 650 of the 982 files, or 66.2%, were handled by the Specialised Prosecutor’s Office, whilst a further 235, or 23.9%, were handled by the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office.
The data also shows a high concentration of supervising prosecutors involved. 567 out of the 982 unique files were decided by just ten prosecutors. The next stage of the study will examine whether there are identifiable patterns in the decisions of individual prosecutors and in their choice as to whether a report should be discontinued or investigative checks should be ordered.
We have identified as a principal concern the possibility that a prosecutorial file may be followed by an application for the use of SSM and the establishment of ME, without subsequent criminal proceedings, while the information gathered remains stored for unclear purposes.
It should be recalled that, during the period under review (2015–2024), a total of 259 court authorisations for the use of SSM against magistrates were identified. If extensions of previously authorised SSM use are excluded, the analysis reaches a minimum of 185 individual magistrates who were subjected to special surveillance measures.
The future status of the information gathered through SSM raises a particularly serious concern. It has been established that at least 238 items of ME were generated, whereas over the same decade there were only four convictions of judges. It is not clear whether SSM were employed in these proceedings. Even assuming they were, our analysis estimates that at least 206 ME records remain which have not been used in criminal proceedings. According to our report, presented by Adela Katchaounova in September 2026, there is no de lege procedure for the destruction of ME established outside the context of instituted criminal proceedings and, following legislative amendments, such datasets are retained by the State Agency for National Security.
Full text of attorney Katchaunova’s presentation:
As we enter the autumn of 2026, it is no secret to anyone in this room that the issue of pressure exerted upon the judiciary has undergone a significant evolution. When we first raised the issue of the secret surveillance of magistrates following the murder of Martin Bozhanov and the disclosures made by Judge Vladislava Tsarigradska, the response of the institutions was predominantly silence and disregard. Today, however, we have new data, including information from SANS, as well as a preliminary analysis of a substantial body of prosecutorial files, enabling us to piece together a more complete picture. It is also noteworthy that, at an institutional level, we are still predominantly met with silence and a lack of action addressing the problem that has been identified.
Today I will not repeat the general findings of the reports you are already familiar with. I wish instead to share with you what has come to light over the past few months: the information that was not included in the original Wiretapping Justice report, but which builds upon and corroborates the information already analysed.
New information from SANS (May 2026): Unlawful Authorisations and Perpetual Archives
Following a series of court proceedings under the Access to Public Information Act, and with the assistance of my colleague, attorney Kashamov, it was not until May 2026 that SANS finally provided information concerning its activities. As with all the other institutions we approached, we requested information covering a ten-year period, 2014–2024. SANS obtained authorisations for the use of SSM in respect of 104 persons, as follows:
The data indicates that authorisations for SSM against magistrates were issued even by the Burgas Court of Appeal, despite its lack of statutory jurisdiction under the Special Surveillance Means Act..
Material evidence was produced in respect of a total of 50 persons out of the 104 who were subjected to surveillance, while the remaining information is only said to have been destroyed. Two persons were subjected to surveillance as a matter of urgency under Article 18(1) of the SSM Act, with the authorisation subsequently being confirmed by the court.
The data provided by SANS corroborate the data collected from the other institutions approached. A total of 259 authorisations for the use of SSM against magistrates during the period under review (2014–2025) have now been officially confirmed. Once extensions are excluded, this amounts to a minimum of 185 individual magistrates who were subjected to surveillance through SSM.
More perilous, however, is what happens to the material collected. At least 238 items of material evidence were produced. At the same time, there were very few criminal proceedings and only four convictions of judges over a ten-year period, while we have no information as to whether SSM were used in those criminal proceedings. If we assume that they were, there are at least 206 items of material evidence that were never used in criminal proceedings. This poses two distinct problems. First, there is no procedure for the destruction of material evidence created outside the context of instituted criminal proceedings. Following the most recent reforms, these datasets were transferred specifically to SANS. They constitute dormant data of potentially compromising material and personal information, maintained by the state apparatus. Secondly, in order for such material evidence to have been created, there is a high probability that conduct amounting to a criminal offence by the magistrates under surveillance was identified, yet no steps were ever taken to institute criminal proceedings and, potentially, bring charges. In other words, the authority holding the material evidence made a conscious decision not to take lawful action and instead to use the information at its discretion and for purposes other than those permitted by law.
Particular attention should also be paid to the number of extensions of the usage of SSM, 74 in total. An extension means that, on two occasions, the authority had to substantiate its SSM application; for an extension to be granted, the application must also contain a full and comprehensive account of the results obtained up to that point through the use of the special surveillance measures. Thus, there is first a written, reasoned application for the initial authorisation of SSM and, secondly, a statement setting out the need for the continued use of SSM and the results obtained to date. Accordingly, the assumption that the 74 magistrates concerned had in fact been implicated in criminal activity is well founded. The question that remains is: Where are the criminal proceedings against those very magistrates?
Preliminary Statistical Analysis of Prosecutorial Files
The usage of SSM does not take place in a vacuum. It goes hand in hand with another instrument of pressure: the opening of prosecutorial files against magistrates. Analysis of the databases concerning the procedural developments and acts in these files reveals a clear chronological and institutional correlation. A total of 1,178 acts were examined, relating to 982 unique files.
Temporal Peaks (1998–2023)
The graph showing the dynamics of prosecutorial acts reveals an exponential increase during the period 2018–2022.
Before 2013, the number of actions was isolated and gradually increased but remained at low levels. All of a sudden, in 2018, they increased to 145, reaching an absolute peak in 2021, with 248 acts and procedural developments, and 226 acts in 2020. This peak coincides with the peak in SSM authorisations issued by the Specialised Criminal Court of Appeal: 62 authorisations in 2020 alone. Following the abolition of the specialised justice system in 2022, we see a sharp decline in prosecutorial acts, to just six in 2023. The same decline is observed in the number of SSM authorisations, which fell to only 13 in 2023.
Concentration of Institutional Pressure
Of the 982 unique files analysed, 66.2% (two thirds, or 650 files) were concentrated in the Specialised Prosecutor’s Office. The Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office accounted for a further 23.9%, or 235 files. Instance-level review was exercised in only 8.7% of cases, while all other regional and district prosecutor’s offices across the country accounted collectively for just 1.2%. This demonstrates that the coercive resources deployed against the judiciary were highly centralised.
What Happens Within the File (Article 145 of the Judiciary Act)?
The allocation of investigations reveals the following mechanism:
In 668 files, there was a direct refusal to proceed, without any specific investigative action being undertaken. In the remaining cases, an operational mechanism was set in motion: 142 files were referred to the Commission for Counteracting Corruption and the Forfeiture of Illegally Acquired Assets (KPKONPI), 98 were referred to structures of the Ministry of Interior (the General Directorate for the National Police / General Directorate for Combating Organised Crime), and 35 were referred directly to SANS. Such investigations may serve as the formal basis for an SSM application. Thus, a file is opened, an investigation is assigned to SANS or the KPKONPI, an SSM application is made to the Specialised Criminal Court of Appeal, data are collected, material evidence is created, and the file is subsequently discontinued, while the material evidence remains indefinitely in the SANS archives. The total number shown in the graph is 1,006 prosecutorial files because, in some cases, more than one authority was referred to for the purpose of carrying out an investigation within its competence.
Even direct refusals, without any investigative action being undertaken, may be problematic and may bear the characteristics of what is known as racketeering, whereas the assignment of specific actions to other authorities may have a coercive character. Determining whether this is the case is a subject for further analysis.
Supervising Prosecutors
The top 10 prosecutors have taken decisions in hundreds of cases:
Prosecutors Hristo Krastev and Georgi Nikolov lead the ranking, with 83 cases decided by each. They are followed by Petar Belchev (72), Angel Kanev (60), Natalia Stancheva (59), Antoaneta Sofronieva (48), and Ventsislav Ferdinandov (47).
This raises the question concerning random allocation of cases. Regardless of the reason for such concentration, however, the conclusion is that a small number of magistrates held the key to operational investigations against their colleagues.
The next level of analysis will examine whether there is a pattern in the decisions of individual prosecutors. The hypothesis is that such correlation does exist and that certain prosecutors predominantly conclude that there is insufficient evidence of a criminal offence and reject the signal on the basis of the magistrate’s immunity, while others choose instead to assign specific actions to other authorities.
A total of 567 files were decided by just ten prosecutors, out of 982 unique files and 1,178 files involving all procedural actions. In other words, the concentration of files by year and by institution coincides with a concentration among a small group of prosecutors who took the decisions.
Conclusions and Necessary Action
We are not talking about isolated cases of corrupt judges who never became the subject of criminal proceedings. We are talking about a structural defect and an abuse of power by the state’s coercive apparatus, directed specifically against judges — in fact, hundreds of judges. The modus operandi is as follows: opening of a prosecutorial file → application for SSM → production of material evidence → discontinuation of the file → perpetual retention of potentially compromising material.
Another possible model is the opening of a file and the collection of a disproportionate amount of data concerning the judge under investigation, disproportionate to the allegations contained in the report.
In accordance with the judgments of the ECtHR in Ekimdzhiev and Others v. Bulgaria, Green Alliance v. Bulgaria and Kanev and Bulgarian Helsinki Committee v. Bulgaria, we call for:
Immediate legislative reform:
— The creation of a statutory procedure providing for the mandatory and verifiable physical destruction of all material evidence that has not been used in instituted criminal proceedings. A bill amending the State Agency for National Security Act is currently on the legislative agenda, unfortunately moving in the opposite direction by concentrating further powers in the hands of the Head of SANS. Following the changes made in 2025 to the body responsible for electing and appointing the Head of SANS, that position has become a political appointment which can readily be subject to political control. In the present circumstances, everything is in the hands of a single political formation.
Full audit of the SANS archives:
– The public and the judicial community must know how many and which magistrates are included in these datasets. If they contain information concerning magistrates in respect of whom evidence of criminal conduct was collected, the least that can be expected is that such information should be removed from the system.
Independent oversight:
– The National Bureau for Control of SSM should cease concealing the relevant data behind generalised statements and should actively notify magistrates where SSM have been unlawfully applied against them. It is plainly necessary to broaden the concept of unlawful use of SSM so that it also encompasses use which is incapable of leading to the institution and conclusion of criminal proceedings.
The independence of a judge is not a personal privilege — every Bulgarian citizen has the right to a fair trial. We cannot allow judicial decisions to be written under the shadow of operational archives, even merely on the suspicion that corrupt magistrates may not have been prosecuted, nor because of the fear that archived materials may contain sensitive personal information which the magistrate concerned would not wish to see made public.
Read the initial investigation bellow:
